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PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS, THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION:  
IF TWO IS COMPANY, IS THREE A CROWD? 
JAMES DUFFY* 
[Court costs, resource-intensive trials, booming prison populations and the obduracy of recidivism 
rates all present as ugly excesses of the criminal law adversarial paradigm. To combat these 
excesses, problem-solving courts have evolved with an edict to address the underlying issues that 
have caused an individual to commit a crime. When a judge seeks to help a problem-solving court 
participant deal with issues like addiction, mental health or poverty, they are performing a very 
different role to that of a judicial officer in the traditional court hierarchy. They are no longer the 
removed, independent arbiter — a problem-solving court judge steps into the ‘arena’ with the 
participant and makes active use of their judicial authority to assist in rehabilitation and positive 
behavioural change. Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence appreciate that their interaction with participants can have therapeutic and anti-therapeutic 
consequences. This article will consider how the deployment of therapeutic measures (albeit with 
good intention) can lead to the behavioural manifestation of partiality and bias on the part of 
problem-solving court judges. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will then be analysed 
to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem-solving courts may be deemed unconstitu-
tional. Part IV of this article will explain how a problem-solving court judge who is not acting 
impartially or independently will potentially contravene the requirements of the Constitution. It will 
finally be suggested that judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most 
successful in administering an independent and impartial problem-solving court.] 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
Berman and Feinblatt’s traditional definition of a problem-solving court states 
that such a court seeks to ‘address the underlying problems of individual 
litigants, the social problems of communities [and] the structural and operational 
problems of a fractured justice system.’1 In Australia, drug courts, alcohol courts, 
mental health courts and domestic/family violence courts are all examples of 
problem-solving courts.2 These courts have a forward-looking focus; an individ-
ual’s past criminal conduct is not downplayed, but the problems that may have 
driven an offender’s criminal behaviour are addressed in a more holistic fashion. 
According to King et al, the approach taken by problem-solving courts ‘reflects a 
realisation by [traditional] courts and legislators that social problems may require 
social as well as legal solutions and that existing forms of judging need to be 
reconsidered.’3 The ambitious scope of problem-solving courts places the 
spotlight on the role of the judicial officer who convenes the court. In a tradi-
tional adversarial court, the skills required of a judge include a good understand-
ing of the law, an excellent grounding in the rules of evidence and sound 
organisational and presentation skills. A problem-solving court judge must 
possess these skills and more. If a problem-solving court judge is prepared to 
address the root cause of an individual’s offending, they need to figuratively 
enter and understand the world in which that offending has occurred. By 
acknowledging that criminal behaviour is rarely a calculated act by a rational 
agent, a problem-solving court becomes well placed to address the ‘story’ behind 
the offending.4 Whilst the problem-solving court judge is first and foremost an 
arbiter of fact and law, in this new environment a judge may also need to wear 
the hat of lawyer, sociologist, psychologist and even psychoanalyst. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence considers the role of the law as a therapeutic agent5 
and theoretically underpins the practice of problem-solving courts.6 Therapeutic 
jurisprudence advocates ‘the use of social science to study the extent to which a 
legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the 
people it affects.’7 If problem-solving courts are prepared to attack the embedded 
causes of criminal offending as the problem (and the offending itself as a 
 
 1 Greg Berman and John Feinblatt, ‘Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer’ in Bruce J Winick 
and David B Wexler (eds), Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Courts (Carolina Academic Press, 2003) 73, 78. 
 2 For a brief description of these courts, see Arie Freiberg, ‘Problem-Oriented Courts: Innovative 
Solutions to Intractable Problems?’ (2001) 11 Journal of Judicial Administration 8. 
 3 Michael King et al, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, 2009) 139. 
 4 It is important to note that whether a criminal act is rational or not, a problem-solving court can 
still be utilised if the program criteria for that court have been met. 
 5 David B Wexler, ‘Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law — Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ 
(1992) 16 Law and Human Behavior 27, 32. 
 6 Peggy Fulton Hora, William G Schma and John T A Rosenthal, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response 
to Drug Abuse and Crime in America’ (1999) 74 Notre Dame Law Review 439, 440; Bruce J 
Winick, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts’ (2003) 30 Fordham Urban 
Law Journal 1055, 1062. 
 7 Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder’ (1995) 1 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 193, 196 (emphasis altered). 
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symptom of the problem), then the social sciences can inform the judge’s role in 
achieving this end. Just as importantly, the social sciences can be utilised to 
identify the pitfalls a judge may encounter when working closely with a rehabili-
tating offender. 
This article will consider the legal and psychological phenomena that impact 
upon a problem-solving court judge when they are attempting to implement 
therapeutic jurisprudence principles. Wexler suggests: 
When therapeutic jurisprudence speaks of looking at the law as a potential 
therapeutic agent, it refers to looking at legal (and administrative) rules and 
procedures and at the roles of legal actors or ‘players,’ which typically include 
lawyers and judges but may include many other actors, such as therapists and 
employers … The emphasis on roles of legal actors, especially when the actors 
operate in a relatively unconstrained legal field — with great discretion in other 
words — is particularly ripe for therapeutic jurisprudence analysis.8 
The object is not to be ‘microanalytic with a vengeance’9 when exploring the 
psychological phenomena that can negatively impact upon the judicial function. 
The reality of these psychological factors is that they can strongly influence the 
perception of the independence and impartiality of a problem-solving court 
judge. If a problem-solving court judge exercises non-judicial power in such a 
manner that their independence and impartiality are compromised, the institu-
tional integrity of that court may be called into question. If the institutional 
integrity of a court is compromised by the exercise of non-judicial power, it will 
be operating unconstitutionally.10 To the extent that these issues highlight the 
potential unconstitutionality of problem-solving courts, they certainly have 
macro-analytic consequences for our legal system. 
A problem-solving court will ultimately attempt to seize on the moment when 
an offender comes before the court, to make a positive, meaningful impact on 
that person’s life. The authority of the court and the power invested in its judge 
to determine the fate of an offender reinforces the seriousness of an offence, but 
also represents a unique opportunity for an offender. The idea is that people will 
be most receptive to change when they are intensely unhappy with their current 
situation.11 This places an offender in a fragile situation in relation to the 
problem-solving court judge. They are in a foreign and formal environment, 
surrounded by people with whom they would not usually associate. In this 
setting a problem-solving court participant may find it difficult to effectively 
communicate, let alone engage in meaningful introspection with regard to their 
offending. Cultural and language barriers as well as emotional flooding may 
 
 8 David B Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1995) 1 Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 220, 225 (citations omitted). 
 9 Ibid 234. Wexler uses this phrase when discussing therapeutic jurisprudence scholarship on legal 
roles. The analysis is micro-analytic as it focuses on the nuanced application of existing law, 
rather than therapeutic jurisprudence’s potential impact on particular rules or particular proce-
dures. 
 10 Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575. 
 11 Astrid Birgden and Tony Ward, ‘Pragmatic Psychology through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Lens: Psycholegal Soft Spots in the Criminal Justice System’ (2003) 9 Psychology, Public Policy, 
and Law 334, 334. 
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further add to the vulnerable position of a participant.12 A problem-solving court 
judge must be cognisant of these factors and the resultant therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic consequences that their words and processes may effect. If a judge is 
not aware of the effect an offender (and that offender’s story) is having on their 
own thoughts and emotions, they are not in a position to regulate their behaviour 
and prevent feelings being acted upon in a way that undermines the goals of the 
problem-solving court. 
In considering the constitutionality of problem-solving courts, this article will 
highlight some therapeutic measures often employed by problem-solving court 
judges. It will be shown (with reference to psychoanalytic literature) how the 
deployment of these therapeutic measures can lead to the behavioural manifesta-
tion of partiality and bias. Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution will 
then be analysed to highlight why the operation and functioning of problem-
solving courts may be deemed unconstitutional. It will finally be suggested that 
judges who possess a high level of emotional intelligence will be the most 
successful in administering an independent and impartial problem-solving court. 
I I   CAT H A R S I S ,  EM PAT H Y A N D  T H E  PY G M A L I O N  EF F E C T 
A  Catharsis 
For a problem-solving court judge to enter the world of a participant, the 
participant must be afforded the opportunity to tell their story. In spite of time 
constraints and busy law lists, processes that promote the opportunity for 
ongoing interaction between judicial officer and participant are conducive to 
positive therapeutic effect.13 King suggests that ‘[l]itigants value telling their 
story to a person in authority who listens and cares about the litigant’s situation, 
being a part of the decision-making process and being treated with respect.’14 
Clark acknowledges that ‘giving traumatized individuals a chance to “tell their 
story” and engage in “account making” is a pathway to healing.’15 If a person is 
able to articulate links between an underlying problem (such as drug/alcohol 
abuse, mental health issues, and traumatic life events) and their criminal offend-
ing, the process can be deeply cathartic. Such introspection may be the result of a 
long standing judge–client relationship, or it may be client-driven and occur at an 
early stage of a problem-solving court process. In either event, the processes 
employed by a problem-solving court judge, and their demeanour,16 body 
language17 and warmth of expression,18 can all promote the cathartic process. 
 
 12 Michael King, ‘Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence from the Bench: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties’ (2003) 28 Alternative Law Journal 172, 174. 
 13 Ibid 174–5. 
 14 Michael King, ‘What Can Mainstream Courts Learn from Problem-Solving Courts?’ (2007) 32 
Alternative Law Journal 91, 92. 
 15 Michael D Clark, ‘A Change-Focused Approach for Judges’ in Bruce J Winick and David B 
Wexler (eds), Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts (Caro-
lina Academic Press, 2003) 137, 142. 
 16 King, ‘Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence from the Bench’, above n 12, 173, citing Carrie J 
Petrucci, ‘Respect as a Component in the Judge–Defendant Interaction in a Specialized Domestic 
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The emotion experienced by a participant in a problem-solving court can act as 
a roadblock to effective communication. Whilst a judge cannot ensure that a 
participant experiences a cathartic episode, they can maximise the potential for 
catharsis to occur. Procedural justice literature highlights the importance of a 
judicial officer providing ‘voice’ and ‘validation’ for a problem-solving court 
participant.19 Voice means providing an environment where the participant can 
tell their story to an attentive court,20 and validation involves the court acknowl-
edging that it has heard the participant, values their contribution and will take 
their story into account.21 Voice, validation and mutual respect between judge 
and participant have been shown to increase the participant’s satisfaction with 
judicial proceedings.22 King identifies ‘respect’ as ‘the manner in which the 
judicial officer interacts with the [participant], whether the judicial officer takes 
time to listen to the participant, the tone of voice and language used and the body 
language of the judicial officer in interacting with the participant.’23 If a prob-
lem-solving court judge is able to convey warmth (a caring manner that shows 
the judge is interested in the participant’s wellbeing), empathy and genuine 
positive regard24 to a participant, they are engaging in a therapeutic communica-
tion that engenders mutual respect.25 Attention to these aspects of procedural 
justice (voice, validation and respect) has been shown to increase a participant’s 
willingness to comply with the ultimate outcome of a case, even if adverse to 
them.26 
B  Empathy 
This article posits that genuine judicial empathy is an essential tool for helping 
people through tough periods of intrapersonal and/or interpersonal conflict. 
Problem-solving court judges employing a therapeutic approach are able to 
harness the power of their own emotions to guide participants through the 
 
Violence Court That Utilizes Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2002) 38 Criminal Law Bulletin 263, 
288. 
 17 King, ‘Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence from the Bench’, above n 12, 174. 
 18 Clark, above n 15, 142. 
 19 Michael S King, ‘The Therapeutic Dimension of Judging: The Example of Sentencing’ (2006) 16 
Journal of Judicial Administration 92, 95. 
 20 Ibid. See also Bruce J Winick and David B Wexler (eds), Judging in a Therapeutic Key: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts (Carolina Academic Press, 2003) 129. 
 21 King, ‘The Therapeutic Dimension of Judging’, above n 19, 95. See also Winick and Wexler, 
above n 20, 129. 
 22 Tom R Tyler, ‘The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil 
Commitment Hearings’ (1992) 46 Southern Methodist University Law Review 433; Winick, 
above n 6, 1089. 
 23 King, ‘The Therapeutic Dimension of Judging’, above n 19, 95. 
 24 Dear explains that genuine positive regard means ‘acceptance of the [participant] and respecting 
his or her value as a person regardless of his or her behaviour. A distinction is drawn between 
accepting the person and accepting his or her behaviour, which might well be unacceptable’: 
Greg E Dear, ‘Therapeutic Communications from the Bench: A Psychological View’ (2006) 1 
eLaw Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law — Special Series 147, 148 
<https://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/issues/special/therapeutic.pdf >. 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Winick, above n 6, 1089. See also Tyler, above n 22, 437. 
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process.27 They can access their own emotional intelligence to assess what a 
participant needs to see, hear, or do at any given point in time during the 
problem-solving court process. The emotional intelligence of judicial officers 
will naturally vary, and as a result there is danger in a judge dealing with 
emotions and empathising when they may not possess the emotional intelligence 
to do so effectively. Whilst emotional intelligence will be discussed later in this 
article, in the judge–offender context it is seen as a ‘competency’ that engenders 
judicial officers with the ‘ability’ to deal with a range of emotions presented to 
them.28 
For the purposes of this article, judicial empathy refers to the ability of prob-
lem-solving court judges to put themselves ‘in the shoes of another, to under-
stand things from their perspective.’29 If a judge is able to recognise the need of a 
participant that underlies their involvement with the problem-solving court, they 
can then accurately communicate back to the participant that their feelings have 
been heard and understood. The judge can successfully attend to the participant’s 
emotional needs. King notes that the art of listening  
requires not only hearing what is said but understanding the intellectual and 
emotional content of what is being said. A party to legal proceedings often not 
only communicates what has happened but how the person felt about what hap-
pened.30  
Judicial empathy at its most effective will therefore encapsulate both cognitive 
and affective components.31 According to Winick, a participant’s words should 
be met with both an intellectual and emotional response.32 A problem-solving 
court judge must communicate that they not only understand the factual pre-
dicament of the individual, but also the individual’s emotions that accompany 
that predicament.33 
To the extent that Winick advocates judicial sympathy (in addition to empathy) 
when attending to the emotional needs of a problem-solving court participant, 
this author disagrees. Whilst empathy may assist a judge in ‘understanding 
 
 27 The way a problem-solving court judge deals with emotion is an incredibly important aspect of 
the judge–participant dyad, but it must be supported by other judicial qualities and techniques. 
Knowledge of the subject area, understanding theories of addiction and mental illness, careful 
reality testing and promoting participant self-efficacy and self-determination are all examples of 
judicial characteristics or processes that complement the affective component of judging. 
 28 See below Part V(B). 
 29 Laurence Boulle, Mediation — Skills and Techniques (Butterworths, 2001) 136. Whilst this 
definition is given in the context of mediation, it is suggested that it is equally applicable to the 
problem-solving court context. In this article, mediation literature will be drawn upon to investi-
gate some of the behavioural phenomena that may impact upon problem-solving court judges. 
Whilst some of this literature has been taken outside of its original context (and hence may 
express views not intended by the authors), these psychological and behavioural phenomena are 
of broader relevance, with obvious applicability to the problem-solving court environment. 
 30 King, ‘The Therapeutic Dimension of Judging’, above n 19, 96. 
 31 These components are outlined in Gerald A Gladstein, ‘Understanding Empathy: Integrating 
Counseling, Developmental, and Social Psychology Perspectives’ (1983) 30 Journal of Counsel-
ing Psychology 467, 468. 
 32 Winick, above n 6, 1069. 
 33 Ibid. 
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experientially as well as intellectually a world very unlike [their] own,’34 
sympathy conflates the feelings of a judge with the feelings of the participant. 
This is reflected in the Greek origin of the word sympathy — sympatheia, 
meaning to suffer together. Little states that ‘[s]ince sympathy suggests an 
affinity between the sympathizing judge and the object of [their] sympathy, the 
risk arises that pity will blind the judge, rendering [them] less able to evaluate 
unfamiliar perspectives.’35 For a problem-solving court judge, empathy is a 
powerful communicative tool, but sympathy is counterproductive. Whilst in 
common parlance we may view the ability to sympathise as a desirable human 
trait, in the judicial context, where independence and impartiality are paramount, 
it is a problematic emotion for a judge to experience. 
When a problem-solving court judge establishes an empathic bond with a 
participant, it does not mean that the judge consequently supports or favours that 
participant. Boulle correctly notes that ‘[e]mpathy does not signify agreement, 
nor does it amount to sympathy with, or compassion for, another. It involves 
convincing a person that the listener has entered their world of perceptions, if 
only temporarily.’36 Understood in this light, ‘sympathy is an emotion, [whereas] 
empathy is a way of acquiring an emotion.’37 Judicial partiality and bias can be 
the subtle and unfortunate consequences of a problem-solving court judge who 
remains unaware of the personal impact a participant’s story is having upon 
them. When a problem-solving court judge attempts to identify with the emo-
tional needs and wants that underpin criminal offending, there is a level of 
interaction that is different from ordinary conversation.38 DeMayo suggests that 
‘[e]ncouraging [a participant] to go beyond objectively stated positions to 
identify and address their private interests can result in the creation of an 
emotionally intimate atmosphere that includes the [judge] as a participant–
observer.’39 This intimate connection between judge and participant goes to the 
heart of problem-solving court methodology. It represents the active use of 
judicial authority to make a positive impression on a participant. This will be 
particularly effective if the participant has never had a person in authority take an 
interest in their welfare.40 When a problem-solving court judge employs an 
empathic approach in such an environment, the participant’s words ‘are more 
likely to touch a responsive chord, particularly when [the participant] describes 
 
 34 Laura E Little, ‘Adjudication and Emotion’ (2002) 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal 205, 210. 
 35 Ibid 209. 
 36 Boulle, above n 29, 136. Alexander and Howieson also draw a clear distinction between the 
concepts of empathy and sympathy. They describe empathy as ‘the ability to put [oneself] in the 
other negotiator’s shoes and to understand where that person is coming from in terms of feel-
ings’, and sympathy as ‘involv[ing] compassion and impl[ying] agreement with the other per-
son’: Nadja Alexander and Jill Howieson, Negotiation: Strategy Style Skills (LexisNexis Butter-
worths, 2nd ed, 2010) 146. 
 37 Justin D’Arms, ‘Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry’ (2000) 74 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1467, 
1479. 
 38 Robert A deMayo, ‘Practical and Ethical Concerns in Divorce Mediation: Attending to 
Emotional Factors Affecting Mediator Judgment’ (1996) 13 Mediation Quarterly 217, 220. 
 39 Ibid. DeMayo defines a participant observer as ‘one who actively participates in an event while 
making professional observations of those at the center of the action’: at 219. 
 40 King, ‘Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence from the Bench’, above n 12, 173. 
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an emotion that resonates with the [judge’s] personal experience.’41 Empathy can 
easily become sympathy when the personal values, feelings and sensitivities of a 
judge are triggered by the plight of a participant in a problem-solving court. The 
judge may lose the separateness of his or her own identity in the empathic 
process,42 in an environment that heightens the potential for emotional reaction. 
C  The Pygmalion Effect 
The Pygmalion effect43 is premised on the idea that an individual will modify 
his or her behaviour and thought processes to align them with the expectations of 
a person in authority. It is related to the theory of self-fulfilling prophecies — the 
proposal that ‘persistently held self-beliefs can become a reality.’44 Formally 
defined, the Pygmalion effect  
is a special case of [self-fulfilling prophecy] whereby a person’s (perceiver’s) 
expectations of another (target) are transferred to, or otherwise have an influ-
ence on, the target such that the target ultimately modifies his or her behavior or 
achievement level in conformity with the expectations.45 
This phenomenon transfers neatly across to the problem-solving court context. 
In simple terms, it suggests that a problem-solving court judge with positive 
regard and high expectations for a participant can induce the participant to act in 
a way that meets those expectations.46 Problem-solving court judges can rely 
upon goal-setting processes and behavioural contracting to outline their expecta-
tions for a participant. To help a participant meet those goals, a judge can boost 
the participant’s self-esteem through positive language, expressed confidence in 
the ability of the participant and praise when the participant succeeds (and even 
sometimes when they fail). Makkai and Braithwaite suggest that praise in such 
an environment can have ‘cognitive effects on individuals through nurturing law-
abiding identities, building cognitive commitments to try harder, encouraging 
 
 41 DeMayo, above n 38, 219 (citations omitted). 
 42 Carl R Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human — A New 
Trend in Psychology (Real People Press, 1967) 93. 
 43 The Pygmalion effect takes its name from ancient Greek mythology. Pygmalion, a Cypriot king, 
carved a statue of the perfect woman out of ivory and named it Galatea. Through the strength of 
will and self-belief of the sculptor, and with the intervention of the goddess Venus, the statue 
then came to life: see D Brian McNatt, ‘Ancient Pygmalion Joins Contemporary Management: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Result’ (2000) 85 Journal of Applied Psychology 314, 314. 
 44 Ibid. 
 45 Ibid. 
 46 Michael King, when discussing strategies for judging in a problem-solving court, highlights the 
value of a judge having positive expectations of participants: 
Low performance levels of repeat offenders may be due in part to the courts’ and justice sys-
tem’s low expectations of them. 
If a solution-focused judicial officer has high but not unrealistic expectations of participants 
and uses strategies demonstrating those expectations, it is likely to enhance the participant’s 
performance in the court program. 
  Michael S King, Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book (Australasian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 2009) 162. 
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individuals who face adversity not to give up … and nurturing belief in one-
self.’47 
Whilst other theories relating to self-belief and self-fulfilling prophecies high-
light the impact of expectation upon performance, the Pygmalion effect uniquely 
highlights ‘the impact that the expectations of persons who are in positions of 
authority have on the self-expectations and performance of those with whom 
they interact.’48 McNatt suggests that the magnitude of Pygmalion effect that 
may be realised is linked to the previous achievement and self-expectancy levels 
of an individual.49 Psychological literature suggests that the positive influence 
and expectations of a judge will produce a greater Pygmalion effect for individu-
als who are low achievers with limited self-efficacy50 — and, to crudely general-
ise for a moment, some problem-solving court participants do possess such 
characteristics. Brockner’s work on behavioural plasticity theory posits that self-
esteem and susceptibility to external influence are inversely related.51 If a 
problem-solving court judge gives credence to these theories, they are in a 
unique position to ‘build up’ the confidence and efficacy of individuals. Their 
positive external influences, exercised in an affirming problem-solving environ-
ment, have great potential to positively impact upon participants, particularly if 
the participants suffer from low self-esteem. 
The Pygmalion effect does have a negative psychological counterpart and 
problem-solving court judges need to be aware of this phenomenon. The Golem 
effect exists where low expectations from an authority figure result in low 
performances of the target.52 It is not difficult to conceive of a scenario where a 
problem-solving court judge becomes frustrated with a participant and feels like 
giving up. In that situation, the warmth and supportive climate of the court may 
be lessened, the participant may be afforded less time and participation in the 
process and the verbal and non-verbal feedback of the judge may trend towards 
the negative (or ambivalent). Even well-intending judges may fall foul of the 
Golem effect. By consistently setting low and easily achievable goals for a 
participant, a judge may not be promoting meaningful change and rehabilitation. 
The participant may come to believe that the judge’s modest goal-setting 
represents the modest expectations that the judge holds for the participant’s 
future. The trick for problem-solving court judges is to establish a ‘good read’ of 
their target — to have high hopes and set high targets for participants, without 
setting them up to fail. 
This Part has suggested that problem-solving court judges who provide oppor-
tunities for catharsis and understand the importance of empathy and the Pygma-
lion effect are more likely to aid in the meaningful rehabilitation of a problem-
 
 47 Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite, ‘Praise, Pride and Corporate Compliance’ (1993) 21 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 73, 74. 
 48 McNatt, above n 43, 315. 
 49 Ibid 316. 
 50 See generally ibid.  
 51 See Joel Brockner, Self-Esteem at Work: Research, Theory and Practice (Lexington Books, 
1988). 
 52 McNatt, above n 43, 316. 
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solving court participant. The difficulty with these approaches is that they leave a 
judge open to allegations of partiality and bias. It is therefore important to 
examine how well-intended psychological processes can be sidetracked. There is 
a large body of psychoanalytic literature that has studied intrapsychic conflict,53 
and judges are beginning to understand the importance of this literature to their 
own problem-solving court practices. 
I I I   TH E  PI T FA L L S 
A  Countertransference 
Academics have noted that just as the judge’s personal qualities can impact 
upon a court participant, so too can the personal qualities of the participant 
influence the judge.54 Countertransference has been identified as ‘the term used 
to describe feelings evoked in the therapist by the client’.55 It involves a counsel-
lor’s ‘reactions to the client that stem from the counselor’s unresolved personal 
issues.’56 According to Burwell-Pender and Halinski, countertransference arises 
‘when a counselor’s past or present experiences are realized in his or her client’s 
present situation.’57 Whilst these descriptions are couched in terms of a doctor–
patient relationship (or counsellor–client relationship), countertransference is a 
broader phenomenon with obvious relevance to the problem-solving court 
environment. There is danger in a problem-solving court judge transferring or 
externalising their feelings onto a participant, where those feelings stem from the 
judge’s prior experiences and relationships.58 A positive experience with a 
rehabilitated drug court participant may see a problem-solving court judge ‘buy 
in’ to their own ability to reform and rehabilitate other drug court participants, 
regardless of the participants’ differing backgrounds and patterns of offending. 
Whilst this can be a positive, such an approach would be detrimental to an 
offender who had no interest in rehabilitation and was consistently flouting the 
conditions of their rehabilitation program. A participant in a domestic violence 
court suffering from depression may remind a judge of a family member’s 
personal battle with mental health issues. As a result, the judge may offer 
opportunities to and downplay the indiscretions of one domestic violence court 
 
 53 ‘Intrapsychic or internal conflict is conflict that resides within the individual. Psychodynamic 
psychiatry, derived from psychoanalytic theory and technique, is the branch of psychiatry that 
studies the individual’s internal states, particularly those dealing with conflict’: Susan Fuku-
shima, ‘What You Bring to the Table: Transference and Countertransference in the Negotiation 
Process’ (1999) 15 Negotiation Journal 169, 170. 
 54 See especially Winick, above n 6, 1070. See also, in the lawyer–client context, Marjorie A Silver, 
‘Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship’ (1999) 6 
Clinical Law Review 259. 
 55 Daniel Bowling and David Hoffman, ‘Bringing Peace into the Room: The Personal Qualities of 
the Mediator and Their Impact on the Mediation’ (2000) 16 Negotiation Journal 5, 11. 
 56 Lezlie Burwell-Pender and Kate H Halinski, ‘Enhanced Awareness of Countertransference’ 
(2008) 36(2) Journal of Professional Counseling: Practice, Theory, and Research 38, 41 (cita-
tions omitted). 
 57 Ibid 41–2 (citations omitted). 
 58 Winick, above n 6, 1070. 
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participant, where they would not do so for another. Viewed in this light, 
countertransference poses a significant threat to the independence and impartial-
ity of a judicial officer. Silver colourfully and correctly notes that ‘[h]uman 
beings carry emotional baggage from early relationships and unload that baggage 
in the relationships they form later in life.’59 Judges are human beings and that 
makes them imperfect creatures. Their thought processes and actions cannot help 
but be shaped by their relationships and life experiences, be they positive or 
negative. The trick for problem-solving court judges is to be present with the 
participant before them, but be cognisant as to how their personal issues may be 
colouring their current experience. 
When a problem-solving court judge experiences positive countertransference, 
they may over-identify with the participant before them. The judge’s own 
emotional, behavioural and cognitive experiences may see the judge positively 
identify with the predicament of a participant, leading to a loss of ‘neutrality or 
objectivity, blurring boundaries, over-praising, [and] excessive care-taking’.60 
Inappropriate judicial behaviour is just as likely to eventuate from negative 
countertransference. Winick notes that problem-solving court judges will 
inevitably have had prior experiences with criminal offenders that produced 
negative and frustrated emotions. In regard to countertransference, he argues that 
[t]he reemergence of these negative feelings engendered in prior relationships 
with offenders may produce a negative counter-transference toward the indi-
vidual appearing in the problem solving court that might compromise the prob-
lem solving court judge’s ability to play the therapeutic role contemplated.61 
In light of the threat countertransference poses to judicial impartiality, it is 
important to note that it can be managed by an experienced problem-solving 
court judge. A distinction can be drawn between countertransference feelings and 
countertransference behaviours (that is, the internal and external reactions to 
countertransference).62 Whilst countertransference feelings may be an unavoid-
able by-product of the judge–client dyad,63 an emotionally intelligent judge will 
rely upon their emotional self-awareness to detect signs of countertransference, 
and emotional self-regulation to prevent any countertransference behaviour that 
may compromise impartiality.  
B  Emotional Contagion 
Emotional contagion is another psychological phenomenon that has the poten-
tial to impact upon a problem-solving court judge’s impartiality. Emotional 
contagion ‘refers to the tendency to catch (experience/express) another person’s 
emotions.’64 One formal definition of emotional contagion (sometimes referred 
 
 59 Silver, above n 54, 263. 
 60 Burwell-Pender and Halinski, above n 56, 42. 
 61 Winick, above n 6, 1070. 
 62 Burwell-Pender and Halinski, above n 56, 43. 
 63 Ibid, using the phrase ‘client–counselor dyad’. 
 64 Masanori Kimura, Ikuo Daibo and Masao Yogo, ‘The Study of Emotional Contagion from the 
Perspective of Interpersonal Relationships’ (2008) 36 Social Behavior and Personality 27, 27 
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to as ‘primitive emotional contagion’ or ‘implicit emotional contagion’) de-
scribes the construct as ‘the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize 
facial expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another 
person and, consequently, to converge emotionally.’65 Emotional contagion is a 
threat to judicial impartiality because a problem-solving court judge can be 
affected by the mood and emotions of a participant.66 The difficulty for problem-
solving court judges lies in combating the non-cognitive nature of the mecha-
nism.67 When a judge engages in empathy, they seek to understand a conflict 
from the perspective of a participant. If emotional contagion is present but 
undetected during the empathic process, a judge may begin to feel the same way 
as a participant about their struggles and rehabilitation. This may see a problem-
solving court judge catch the optimism and excitement of a drug court partici-
pant on a good day. If the judge is influenced by this optimism and fails to 
‘reality test’ the participant (with an eye on their previous program compliance), 
they may be setting the participant up for future failure. Optimistic goal-setting 
in such a situation may be entirely inappropriate if the participant is usually 
apathetic or even negative towards their prospects of rehabilitation. The emo-
tional convergence between judge and participant may physically manifest itself 
in vocal, postural and expressional imitation. If the judge remains unaware of the 
emotional contagion, their own physical reciprocity of affective expression is 
bound to lead to perceptions of partiality.68 
A problem-solving court judge who applies the principles of the Pygmalion 
effect and engages in judicial empathy does not automatically suffer from 
countertransference and emotional contagion. This conclusion is supported by 
literature69 that draws a sharp distinction between the ‘sophisticated cognitive 
forms of empathy and the primitive, basic process of emotional contagion’.70 It 
is, however, suggested that problem-solving court judges who genuinely care 
about the participants before them, who seek to identify the emotional drivers of 
conflict and to address the problems that underlie offending, are vulnerable to 
emotional transfer and affect. Problem-solving court judges attempting to judge 
in a therapeutic key are potentially strong conduits for countertransference and 
emotional contagion. Even if judicial ‘empathy does not directly induce sympa-
thy’ (through countertransference and emotional contagion), ‘it can certainly set 
 
(emphasis altered), citing Elaine Hatfield, John T Cacioppo and Richard L Rapson, Emotional 
Contagion (Cambridge University Press, 1994) 7. 
 65 Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, above n 64, 5, quoting John G Carlson and Elaine Hatfield, 
Psychology of Emotion (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992) 153–4. 
 66 It is worth noting that the issue of emotional contagion in problem-solving courts should not 
always carry negative connotations. Skilful judges frequently take advantage of this phenome-
non, in the hope that the positive and optimistic mood they bring to a court will ‘rub off’ on the 
parties. This form of emotional contagion would seem to have a lot in common with the Pygma-
lion effect. 
 67 D’Arms, above n 37, 1483. 
 68 See Tricia S Jones and Andrea Bodtker, ‘Mediating with Heart in Mind: Addressing Emotion in 
Mediation Practice’ (2001) 17 Negotiation Journal 217, 226. 
 69 Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, above n 64, 5. 
 70 R William Doherty, ‘The Emotional Contagion Scale: A Measure of Individual Differences’ 
(1997) 21 Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 131, 132, citing ibid. 
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the stage for [judicial] sympathy’,71 with partiality and bias playing the lead 
roles. 
IV  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 
One of the interesting tensions surrounding problem-solving courts is whether 
the functioning of these courts, and the powers exercisable by their constituent 
judges, are constitutionally valid. There is a danger that when judges attempt to 
employ therapeutic measures in the courtroom, their good intentions may blur 
the lines between the different branches of government.72 Freiberg notes that 
[p]roactive judging, which requires the presiding officer to act as judge, mentor, 
supervisor and service broker threatens some of the core judicial values such as 
impartiality, fairness, certainty and the separation of powers between the judici-
ary and the executive. In what role do judges act when they seek or arrange the 
provision of services? Is due process met when judges both hand down sen-
tences and supervise and deal with breaches of their orders?73 
To understand whether the proactive judging role in problem-solving courts is 
constitutional, an analysis of ch III of the Commonwealth Constitution is 
necessary. The layout of the Constitution reflects the separation of powers in 
Australia:74 ch I establishes the Parliament, ch II establishes the executive 
government and, most importantly for present purposes, ch III establishes the 
judicature. To ensure that the doctrine of separation of powers achieves its 
desired outcome, there needs to exist both an institutional and functional 
separation of powers between the three branches of government.75 
The effect of ss 71 and 77(iii) of the Constitution, interpreted in light of R v 
Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (‘Boilermakers’ Case’),76 is 
that Commonwealth judicial power can only be exercised by the High Court of 
Australia, federal courts created by the Commonwealth Parliament, and state and 
territory courts vested with federal jurisdiction. In addition, the Commonwealth 
Parliament cannot confer non-judicial power on these courts.77 If a problem-
solving court is created and given its jurisdiction by a piece of Commonwealth 
legislation, then (with certain possible exceptions) it may be unconstitutional for 
 
 71 D’Arms, above n 37, 1479. 
 72 Berman and Feinblatt, above n 1, 82. 
 73 Freiberg, above n 2, 23 (citations omitted). 
 74 See R v Davidson (1954) 90 CLR 353, 380–1 (Kitto J). 
 75 See Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Penguin 
Books, 8th ed, 1998) 19. Scott Guy writes in Constitutional Law (Pearson, 2010) 89: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers asserts that governmental functions can be divided 
into three categories: legislative, executive and judicial; that the organs of government should 
be similarly divided into the legislative, executive and judiciary [(institutional separation)]; 
and that each institutional function of government should be exercised only by the relevant 
organ of government. 
  A strict separation of powers is not found in Australia, as our nation has adopted the Westminster 
system of government and adheres to the doctrine of responsible government. 
 76 (1956) 94 CLR 254. 
 77 Ibid. 
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a problem-solving court judge to exercise non-judicial power consistently with 
that legislation.78 
 
 78 In ibid 271–2 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ) (emphasis added), it was stated that 
‘the Constitution does not allow the use of courts established by or under Chap III for the dis-
charge of functions which are not in themselves part of the judicial power and are not auxiliary 
or incidental thereto.’ An argument could be mounted that the non-judicial powers exercisable by 
a problem-solving court are incidental to the effective exercise of their judicial power. The real-
ity, however, is that the expansion of the judicial officer role in a problem-solving court — from 
adjudication to helping an offender solve underlying problems — may involve an exercise of 
non-judicial power that is more than simply ‘incidental’ to the exercise of judicial power. Much 
would turn on how broadly the courts are prepared to interpret the phrase ‘auxiliary or incidental 
thereto’. Whilst the phrase has been used in the Boilermakers’ Case (and the word ‘incidental’ in 
R v Joske; Ex parte Shop Distributive and Allied Employees’ Association (1976) 135 CLR 194), 
its scope has not been seriously considered. Additionally, it is suggested that when considering 
whether a conferral of non-judicial power under Commonwealth legislation is incidental to the 
exercise of judicial power, the same factors would be relevant irrespective of whether the confer-
ral is on a federal or a state court: Queen Victoria Memorial Hospital v Thornton (1953) 87 CLR 
144. A second exception to the principle that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot confer non-
judicial power on ch III courts lies in the ‘persona designata’ rule. In Drake v Minister for Immi-
gration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577, 584 (Bowen CJ and Deane J) it was held that 
[t]here is nothing in the Constitution which precludes a justice of the High Court or a judge of 
[the Federal Court] or any other court created by the Parliament under Ch III of the Constitu-
tion from, in his personal capacity, being appointed to an office involving the performance of 
administrative or executive functions including functions which are quasi judicial in their na-
ture. 
  An argument could be made that when problem-solving court judges are exercising non-judicial 
power, they are acting in a personal capacity and not as ch III judges exercising non-ch III power. 
Much would depend on the nature of the power conferred on the judges by legislation. In Hil-
ton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57, 73 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ) it was stated that 
the nature of the power conferred is of importance in deciding whether the judge on whom it is 
conferred is intended to exercise it in his capacity as a judge or as a designated person. If the 
power is judicial, it is likely that it is intended to be exercisable by the judge by virtue of that 
character; if it is purely administrative, and not incidental to the exercise of judicial power, it is 
likely that it is intended to be exercised by the judge as a designated person. 
  It is important to acknowledge, however, that the power of a problem-solving court judge to 
exercise non-judicial power in their personal capacity would not be unlimited. Non-judicial 
functions cannot be conferred without the judge’s consent, and ‘no function can be conferred that 
is incompatible either with the judge’s performance of his or her judicial functions or with the 
proper discharge by the judiciary of its responsibilities as an institution exercising judicial power 
(“the incompatibility condition”)’: Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 364–5 (Brennan CJ, 
Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). Finally, it could be argued that a Commonwealth Parliament 
conferral of non-judicial power on a state problem-solving court may in some circumstances be 
seen as valid. In Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153, 178, Isaacs J 
stated that 
some matters so clearly and distinctively appertain to one branch of government as to be inca-
pable of exercise by another. … Other matters may be subject to no a priori exclusive delimi-
tation, but may be capable of assignment by Parliament in its discretion to more than one 
branch of government. 
  The High Court has acknowledged the difficulties in labelling certain powers as judicial and 
others as non-judicial (administrative or executive). As a result, the High Court has stated that 
when ‘classifying the nature of a power impugned, regard may properly be had to the repository 
entrusted by the Parliament to exercise the power’: Pasini v United Mexican States (2002) 209 
CLR 246, 265 [53] (Kirby J), citing Cominos v Cominos (1972) 127 CLR 588, 599 (Gibbs J), 
605–6 (Stephen J). A problem-solving court, vested with a (non) judicial power, would be ex-
pected to exercise that power in a court-like fashion. It is possible that the High Court would 
uphold the power of Parliament to confer non-judicial powers on problem-solving courts ‘that, 
“chameleon like”, took their character from the repository in question’: Pasini v United Mexican 
States (2002) 209 CLR 246, 267 [59] (Kirby J) (citations omitted). 
  These arguments are all perhaps academic. Whether by accident or design, almost every 
problem-solving court in Australia is established by state legislation. Given the wider scope of 
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The ability of state courts to exercise judicial and/or non-judicial power is 
subtly different to that of federal courts. The principal reason for this is that there 
is no constitutional requirement for separation of judicial power at the state 
level.79 Castan notes that: 
The Commonwealth Constitution … makes no mention of the judicial power of 
the states or territories, and only refers to the state courts as potential holders of 
federal jurisdiction … Thus, the assumption was made that the Commonwealth 
Constitution enforced no limits on the state Parliaments’ conferrals of power on 
state courts; judicial power can be vested in non-judicial bodies, and state 
courts could be vested with mixed judicial and non-judicial powers, as the Boil-
ermakers’ principles did not apply.80 
In the case of Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (‘Kable’)81 this 
assumption was altered and a majority of the High Court held that the conferral 
of non-judicial power on a state court may be incompatible with the role of a 
state court as a repository of federal judicial power.82 To state it another way, 
 
state legislatures to invest their courts with non-judicial powers (with limitations discussed be-
low), many of the problems surrounding Commonwealth Parliament conferrals of non-judicial 
power on ch III courts can be neatly sidestepped. 
 79 Peacock v Newtown Marrickville and General Co-Operative Building Society No 4 Ltd (1943) 
67 CLR 25; Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South 
Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372; City of Collingwood v Victoria 
[No 2] [1994] 1 VR 652; Gilbertson v South Australia [1978] AC 772; Nicholas v Western Aus-
tralia [1972] WAR 168. 
 80 Melissa Castan, Constitutional Law (Pearson, 2008) 139. 
 81 (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
 82 Kable had been convicted of the manslaughter of his wife. While in custody, it was alleged that 
he had sent a series of threatening letters through the mail. Section 5 of the Community Protec-
tion Act 1994 (NSW) provided that the Supreme Court of New South Wales could make an order 
of continued detention (for up to six months) if it was satisfied that Kable was more likely than 
not to commit a serious act of violence and it was appropriate for the protection of a particular 
person, or the community in general, to keep him in custody: ibid 62–4 (Brennan CJ). A majority 
of the High Court held that the legislation was incompatible with ch III of the Constitution: 
at 106–7 (Gaudron J), 124 (McHugh J), 127–8 (Gummow J). Gaudron J captured the essence of 
the High Court’s reasoning when she stated at 106–7 that 
[t]he power purportedly conferred by s 5(1) of the Act requires the making of an order, if the 
conditions specified in s 5(1) are satisfied, depriving an individual of his liberty, not because 
he has breached any law, whether civil or criminal, but because an opinion is formed, on the 
basis of material which does not necessarily constitute evidence admissible in legal proceed-
ings, that he ‘is more likely than not’ (s 5(1)(a)) to breach a law by committing a serious act of 
violence as defined in s 4 of the Act. That is the antithesis of the judicial process … It is not a 
power that is properly characterised as a judicial function, notwithstanding that it is purport-
edly conferred on a court and its exercise is conditioned in terms usually associated with the 
judicial process. 
Moreover, when regard is had to the precise nature of the function purportedly conferred by 
s 5(1), the matters to be taken into account in its exercise and its contrariety to what is ordinar-
ily involved in the judicial process, the effect of s 5(1) is, in my view, to compromise the integ-
rity of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and, because that court is not simply a State 
court but a court which also exists to exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, it also 
has the effect of compromising the integrity of the judicial system brought into existence by 
Ch III of the Constitution. 
  The author is not positioning Gaudron J’s judgment as the leading decision or primary articula-
tion of Kable principles. McHugh J and Gummow J agreed on the result for similar reasons: 
at 124 (McHugh J), 127–8 (Gummow J). Toohey J was also in the majority, but limited the Kable 
incompatibility test to circumstances where the state court was actually exercising federal juris-
diction: at 96, 98–9. Brennan CJ and Dawson J were in dissent. 
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ch III of the Constitution ‘impliedly prevents the Parliament of a State from 
conferring powers on the Supreme Court of a State which are repugnant to or 
inconsistent with the exercise by it of the judicial power of the Common-
wealth.’83 The thought process behind this restriction on state legislative power 
is related to the integrated judicial system (the ‘autochthonous expedient’)84 that 
is provided by ch III of the Constitution. Gaudron J explains that 
State courts, when exercising federal jurisdiction ‘are part of the Australian ju-
dicial system created by Ch III of the Constitution and, in that sense and on that 
account, they have a role and existence which transcends their status as courts 
of the States’ … [this] directs the conclusion that Ch III requires that the Par-
liaments of the States not legislate to confer powers on State courts which are 
repugnant to or incompatible with their exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth.85 
The post-Kable consequence for problem-solving courts created by state 
legislatures is that they may be vested with non-judicial power, to the extent that 
the exercise of those powers is not repugnant to or incompatible with the 
exercise of Commonwealth judicial power (‘Kable incompatibility test’). This 
would be the case even if the problem-solving court was not actually exercising 
federal jurisdiction.86  
A series of post-Kable High Court decisions has helped to clarify the Kable 
incompatibility test and its reach into the state sphere. A narrow (and perhaps 
artificial) reading of Kable may have suggested that the Kable principles only 
applied to the Supreme Courts of the states. However, the case of North Austra-
lian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (‘Bradley’)87 established that 
ch III of the Constitution also limits the power of territory courts to exercise non-
judicial power, as they too are a repository of Commonwealth judicial power. 
Bradley involved a constitutional challenge to the appointment of a Chief 
Magistrate in the Northern Territory pursuant to the Magistrates Act 1977 (NT). 
The Magistrates Act was challenged on the basis that it ‘authorised the appoint-
ment of a Chief Magistrate to age sixty-five but with remuneration fixed only for 
the first two years of the term.’88 In rejecting this challenge and dismissing the 
appeal, the High Court accepted the proposition that ‘it is implicit in the terms of 
Ch III of the Constitution, and necessary for the preservation of that structure, 
 
 83 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 100 (Gaudron J). 
 84 Boilermakers’ Case (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
 85 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 103. Similar sentiments are expressed by McHugh J at 114–15. 
 86 Toohey J (who was part of the majority in Kable) limited the incompatibility test to a situation 
where a state court was actually exercising federal jurisdiction. His judgment therefore differs 
from the rest of the majority. His Honour stated at ibid 94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 
that 
[t]o the extent that they are invested with federal jurisdiction, the federal courts and the courts 
of the States exercise a common jurisdiction. It follows that in the exercise of its federal juris-
diction a State court may not act in a manner which is incompatible with Ch III of the Com-
monwealth Constitution. 
 87 (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
 88 Ibid 161 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
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that a court capable of exercising the judicial power of the Commonwealth be 
and appear to be an independent and impartial tribunal.’89 
The immediate effect of Bradley upon problem-solving courts is pronounced. 
If a problem-solving court is operating under the auspice of a state or territory 
Magistrates Court, then the Kable restrictions on the exercise of non-judicial 
power will apply to that court. Even if a problem-solving court is not acting as a 
division of the Magistrates, District or Supreme Court of a state or territory, if it 
is a possible receptacle for Commonwealth judicial power, then its powers are 
limited by the Kable incompatibility test.90 The drug courts in Queensland 
provide a good example. Under s 9(1) of the Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) the 
Governor in Council may declare one or more Magistrates Courts to be drug 
courts. Section 10(2) declares that nothing within the Act prevents a drug court 
magistrate exercising the jurisdiction of a Magistrates Court at any time. As a 
drug court can exercise the powers of the Magistrates Court and the Magistrates 
Court can exercise the judicial powers of the Commonwealth, it would appear 
that this problem-solving court is subject to the Kable incompatibility test. A 
similar outcome would result from the New South Wales drug court legislation. 
Section 24 of the Drug Court Act 1998 (NSW) grants the New South Wales Drug 
Court the criminal jurisdiction of the District Court and all of the functions of 
that Court exercisable in relation to its criminal jurisdiction, the criminal 
jurisdiction of a Local Court and all of the functions of such a court exercisable 
in relation to its criminal jurisdiction, and any other jurisdiction conferred on it 
by another Act of Parliament. The Kable incompatibility test applies to the New 
South Wales Drug Court, as the criminal jurisdiction of both the District Court 
and the Local Court provides for the exercise of the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth. 
In the same year that Bradley was decided, the High Court delivered a decision 
that further clarified the Kable incompatibility test. In Fardon v Attorney-
General (Qld) (‘Fardon’)91 the High Court considered the application of the 
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), an Act that authorised 
the continued detention of a sex offender (without their being charged for an 
offence) on the basis that they constituted a serious danger to the community. 
Fardon was initially imprisoned for committing rape, and 20 days after his 
release he committed further offences of rape, sodomy and assault occasioning 
bodily harm.92 Fardon appealed against the constitutionality of the Dangerous 
 
 89 Ibid 163. 
 90 This point was made emphatically by Kirby J in K-Generation Pty Ltd v Liquor Licensing Court 
(2009) 237 CLR 501, 560 [208]–[209]: 
Moreover, the Kable principle is implied from a unique provision which empowers the Federal 
Parliament to make laws investing ‘any court of a State’ with ‘federal jurisdiction’. 
If the Constitution had meant to restrict integration to investing only the State Supreme Courts 
with federal jurisdiction, it could have said so. Instead, the constituent parts of the integrated 
Judicature were extended to include other courts, indeed ‘any’ court of a State. If, therefore, a 
tribunal within a State qualifies as a ‘court’ and is able to be invested with federal jurisdiction, 
it must meet the Kable requirements. 
 91 (2004) 223 CLR 575. 
 92 Ibid 587 (Gleeson CJ). 
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Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act on the basis that it authorised the Supreme 
Court to exercise judicial power inconsistently with ch III of the Constitution.93 
The High Court upheld the validity of the Act, as it ‘did not impair the institu-
tional integrity of the Supreme Court of Queensland in such a fashion as to be 
incompatible with the Court’s constitutional position as a potential repository of 
federal judicial power.’94 As all members of the majority (Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh J, Gummow J, Hayne J, and Callinan and Heydon JJ) relied upon 
‘institutional integrity’ as the new touchstone for applying the Kable incompati-
bility test95 and the main indicia behind institutional integrity have been identi-
fied as independence and impartiality,96 the criterion for the operation of the 
Kable test has been narrowed.97 
As a result, we can conclude that problem-solving courts enacted by state 
legislation are not subject to the same limitations regarding non-judicial power as 
federal courts. The constitutional validity of these courts will only be in issue 
when they exercise non-judicial power in a way that compromises the independ-
ence and impartiality of the court as a possible repository of federal judicial 
power. These sentiments were echoed most recently by the High Court in South 
Australia v Totani (‘Totani’).98 French CJ reiterated that  
 
 93 Counsel for Fardon outlined at ibid 577 (S R Southwood QC) (during argument) why the 
legislation should have been held to be unconstitutional:  
Sections 8 and 13 [of the Act] are repugnant to Ch III because they purport to give the Court 
power to order: the civil commitment to prison; detention in prison on the basis of a risk of re-
offending in the future in the absence of a crime, a trial and a conviction; imprisonment 
without application of established principles relating to civil commitment for mental illness; 
punishment of a class of prisoner selected by the legislature in a manner inconsistent with the 
essential character of a court and the nature of judicial power; and to subject a prisoner to 
double punishment for previous crimes. 
 94 Ibid 576 (emphasis added). This quote is from the head note. 
 95 Ibid 591 [15] (Gleeson CJ), 598 [35] (McHugh J), 614 [90], 617–18 [102] (Gummow J), 
648 [198] (Hayne J), 652–3 [212]–[213] (Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
 96 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76 (Gummow, 
Hayne and Crennan JJ) (citations omitted): 
But as is recognised in Kable, Fardon … and … Bradley, the relevant principle is one which 
hinges upon maintenance of the defining characteristics of a ‘court’, or in cases concerning a 
Supreme Court, the defining characteristics of a State Supreme Court. It is to those characteris-
tics that the reference to ‘institutional integrity’ alludes …  
An important element, however, in the institutional characteristics of courts in Australia is their 
capacity to administer the common law system of adversarial trial. Essential to that system is 
the conduct of trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
 97 Jennifer Clarke, Patrick Keyzer and James Stellios, Hanks’ Australian Constitutional Law: 
Materials and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2009) 1150. 
 98 (2010) 242 CLR 1. Totani involved a constitutional challenge against the validity of s 14(1) of 
the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA). That section provided: ‘The Court 
must, on application by the Commissioner, make a control order against a person (the defendant) 
if the Court is satisfied that the defendant is a member of a declared organisation’ (see Totani 
(2010) 242 CLR 1, 24 [17] (French CJ)). On application by the Commissioner of Police under 
s 8 of the Act, the Attorney-General, under s 10(1), could make a declaration in respect of an 
organisation if satisfied that members of the organisation associate to commit serious crimes that 
threaten public safety (see Totani at 23 [12] (French CJ)). On 14 May 2009, the Attorney-General 
for South Australia made a declaration regarding the Finks Motorcycle Club. On 25 May and 4 
June 2009, the Commissioner applied for control orders against Donald Hudson and Sandro 
Totani, alleging each was a member of the club: at 21–2 [6] (French CJ). The effect of a control 
order was to place restrictions upon the freedom of association and communication of the person 
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[t]he absence of an entrenched doctrine of separation of powers under the 
constitutions of the States at Federation and thereafter does not detract from the 
acceptance at Federation and the continuation today of independence, 
impartiality, fairness and openness as essential characteristics of the courts of 
the States. Nor does the undoubted power of State Parliaments to determine the 
constitution and organisation of State courts detract from the continuation of 
those essential characteristics. It is possible to have organisational diversity 
across the Federation without compromising the fundamental requirements of a 
judicial system.99 
The Chief Justice made explicit that this ‘ample allowance for diversity in the 
constitution and organisation of [state] courts’ existed despite Kable limitations 
on state legislative power and those decisions which further refine the Kable 
incompatibility test.100  
The difficulty in assessing the constitutional validity of problem-solving courts 
is magnified by the High Court’s equivocal stance as to when the independence 
and impartiality of a state court will be undermined.101 The concern has been 
expressed that these aspirational terms are difficult to precisely define and that as 
a result questions remain as to ‘just how independent and impartial a State court 
must remain to avoid offending Chapter III [of the Constitution].’102 Gleeson CJ 
held in Bradley that ‘there is no single ideal model of judicial independence, 
personal or institutional’,103 and it is submitted in this article that there should 
not be. The characteristics of judicial independence and impartiality do not exist 
in a vacuum; they take their flavour from forum and context. Judicial independ-
ence and impartiality may look very different in a problem-solving court 
compared to in a criminal trial in a Supreme Court, but that does not mean that 
the institutional integrity of a problem-solving court is in any way lessened. 
Indeed, the High Court commented in Forge v Australian Securities and Invest-
ments Commission (‘Forge’)104 that ‘judicial independence and impartiality may 
be ensured by a number of different mechanisms, not all of which are seen, or 
need to be seen, to be applied to every kind of court.’105 
 
to whom it applies and others who might wish to communicate with them: at 22 [7] (French CJ). 
Gummow J, who was in the majority of the High Court, held at 67 [149] that 
the practical operation of s 14(1) of the Act is to enlist a court of a State … in the implementa-
tion of the legislative policy stated in s 4 by an adjudicative process in which the Magistrates 
Court is called upon effectively to act at the behest of the Attorney-General to an impermissi-
ble degree, and thereby to act in a fashion incompatible with the proper discharge of its federal 
judicial responsibilities and with its institutional integrity. 
 99 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 45 [66]. 
100 Ibid 46 [68]. 
101 Brendan Gogarty and Benedict Bartl, ‘Tying Kable Down: The Uncertainty about the Independ-
ence and Impartiality of State Courts Following Kable v DPP (NSW) and Why It Matters’ (2009) 
32 University of New South Wales Law Journal 75, 76. 
102 Ibid 92. 
103 (2004) 218 CLR 146, 152. 
104 (2006) 228 CLR 45. 
105 Ibid 82 (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ). 
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If independence relates to the constitutional situation of the judiciary106 and is 
conceived as the separation of the judiciary from the executive and legislature, 
then attention will be drawn to problem-solving courts and their cooperative 
efforts with the community and the executive. Whilst these collaborative efforts 
between the judiciary and executive increase the potential for the independence 
of problem-solving courts to be compromised, it does not logically follow that 
the institutional integrity of the problem-solving court will be compromised.  
It is suggested that problem-solving courts are shielded (to a large degree) 
from criticism of their independence where they possess an impartial judicial 
appointment process and where their judges have security of tenure and remu-
neration and are provided with adequate legal training.107 It is worth reinforcing 
the point that in Fardon and Baker v The Queen (‘Baker’)108 the Kable incom-
patibility doctrine did not apply, as in those cases a ‘sufficient quantum of 
judicial independence and impartiality was maintained by providing for judicial 
discretion and due process under the legislation.’109 When problem-solving court 
judges operate in a therapeutic manner and when they seek or arrange the 
provision of services to aid a participant’s rehabilitation, they are not usurping 
the role of the executive. They are not masquerading as ‘do gooder’ amateur 
psychiatrists, driven by ‘pop-psychopharmacology’ and ‘fuzzy-headed notions’ 
of therapeutic jurisprudence.110 In many ways, problem-solving court judges are 
facilitators, not service providers. As King highlights, in a problem-solving court 
context ‘the Executive and community agencies — not the court — provide 
support and treatment services while the court has a supervisory role over the 
participants.’111 It is perhaps for this reason that there has been, as King notes, a 
change of rhetoric from ‘problem-solving courts’ to ‘solution-focused courts’.112 
The term ‘problem-solving court’ suggests that it is the court that helps a 
participant solve the underlying problems that have led to their offending. Critics 
have seized on these semantics to suggest that problem-solving court judges are 
‘robed therapeutic administrators’,113 operating under the cloak of pseudo-
science, attempting to solve psychological problems in which they have no 
experience. These criticisms are simply (albeit eloquently) overstated. The 
reality is that a problem-solving court judge is a facilitator of positive behav-
 
106 Michael S King, ‘Judging, Judicial Values and Judicial Conduct in Problem-Solving Courts, 
Indigenous Sentencing Courts and Mainstream Courts’ (2010) 19 Journal of Judicial Administra-
tion 133, 148, citing Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct 
(2nd ed, 2007) 5–6. 
107 See Gogarty and Bartl, above n 101, 99. 
108 (2004) 223 CLR 513. 
109 Gogarty and Bartl, above n 101, 91 n 96. 
110 Morris B Hoffman, ‘The Drug Court Scandal’ (2000) 78 North Carolina Law Review 1437, 
1440, 1479. 
111 King, ‘Judging, Judicial Values and Judicial Conduct’, above n 106, 146. 
112 Ibid 137. See also Michael S King, ‘Should Problem Solving Courts Be Solution-Focused 
Courts?’ (2011) 80 Revista Juridica Universidad de Puerto Rico (forthcoming) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1725022>. 
113 Hoffman, above n 110, 1527. 
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ioural change, rather than an institution that makes the change.114 Catharsis, 
empathy and the Pygmalion effect all facilitate the possibility of positive 
behavioural change and rehabilitation of a participant. They are not treatments 
‘administered’ to a participant to help them solve their problems. 
Impartiality is likewise a judicial value that must be assessed within the work-
ing context of a problem-solving court. The Australian Guide to Judicial 
Conduct lists the broad indicia of judicial impartiality: ‘to be fair and even-
handed, to be patient and attentive, and to avoid stepping into the arena or 
appearing to take sides.’115 These indicia of impartiality sit uncomfortably with 
the functioning of problem-solving courts, which have active judicial involve-
ment as a defining feature.116 There is no doubt that increased judicial interaction 
with a participant heightens the possibility of partiality. Direct conversations 
involving positive body language and warmth of expression, reality-testing based 
on theories of addiction and mental illness, and collaboratively worked strategies 
designed to promote self-efficacy and offender self-determination all place 
stressors on the impartiality of the problem-solving court judge. In the context of 
drug courts, Hoffman notes that  
it is de rigeur that drug courts cannot operate successfully without the ‘coopera-
tion’ of the judge, prosecutors, police, sheriffs, and defense lawyers. The very 
instant this ‘cooperation’ is achieved, the protections inherent in the adversary 
nature of our system are put at risk.117  
There is no doubt that Hoffman is correct in this regard and that the collabora-
tive rather than adversarial nature of problem-solving courts places stressors 
upon the impartiality of a problem-solving court judge. That acknowledged, 
collaboration and the quantum of judicial involvement in a proceeding are, of 
themselves, a weak measure of judicial impartiality. King pertinently suggests 
that  
giving undue emphasis to the quantum of judicial intervention in considering 
impartiality is to ignore the multiplicity of situations where judicial involve-
ment is needed. Although excessive judicial involvement in any proceeding has 
the potential to not only raise issues as to impartiality but to compromise the 
very purpose of the proceedings, it is the nature of the particular proceedings 
 
114 King, Solution-Focused Judging Bench Book, above n 46, 4 (citations omitted) notes that in 
solution-focused judging 
the court is more a facilitator and a change agent than an institution that makes the change. The 
court sees participants as being able to engage in the natural change process themselves, with 
the support of the judicial officer and the court team. Indeed, the fact that much positive 
behavioural change in individuals with problems occurs without the intervention of authorities 
or treatment agencies supports the proposition that change is natural. 
115 Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, above n 106, 3. It is interesting to note that this 
guide, when discussing the issue of impartiality, notes that it is not a blanket concept that can be 
precisely defined and adhered to in all contexts: 
The application of the requirement of impartiality is always subject to considerations of neces-
sity. This may mean that in a small court, or in a court that sits in an isolated location, or in a 
court such as the High Court where members have a constitutional responsibility to sit, the 
significance of [impartiality issues] will differ. 
116 Berman and Feinblatt, above n 1, 79. 
117 Hoffman, above n 110, 1524. 
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and the nature of the involvement that are important in considering whether im-
partiality and other judicial values have been affected.118 
To state it another way, judicial impartiality should be assessed according to the 
quality of involvement and intervention rather than the quantum. 
Given the above discussion on the Kable incompatibility doctrine and issues of 
independence and impartiality, this article suggests that generally,119 there are 
good reasons which militate against the conclusion that problem-solving courts 
operate unconstitutionally: 
1 The separation of powers between executive, legislature and judiciary is 
not strictly provided for under state constitutions. 
2 The High Court has acknowledged that state legislatures may vest state 
courts with non-judicial powers and that ‘the full panoply of principle ema-
nating from Boilermakers and the separation of judicial power in Ch III 
applicable at the federal level, does not apply at State level.’120 At a very 
base level, state problem-solving courts can exercise a degree of non-
judicial power. 
3 Sections 4AAA and 4AAB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) specifically 
envisage that functions and powers which are neither judicial, nor inciden-
tal to the exercise of judicial power, may be conferred on judges and mag-
istrates in the states and territories.121 
4 The refined Kable incompatibility test, revolving around notions of institu-
tional integrity, independence and impartiality, sets a high threshold for the 
invalidation of state legislation.122 McHugh J noted in Fardon: 
The bare fact that particular State legislation invests a State court with powers 
that are or jurisdiction that is repugnant to the traditional judicial process will 
seldom, if ever, compromise the institutional integrity of that court to the ex-
tent that it affects that court’s capacity to exercise federal jurisdiction impar-
tially and according to federal law.123 
This seems to suggest that only in an extreme case would the exercise of 
non-judicial power by a problem-solving court be sufficient to compromise 
the institutional integrity of that court. The exercise of non-judicial power 
would need to be of such a nature (and magnitude) that a state judge or 
 
118 King, ‘Judging, Judicial Values and Judicial Conduct’, above n 106, 150. 
119 It is difficult to draw sweeping conclusions about the constitutionality of different problem-
solving courts without considering the enacting legislation which governs the jurisdiction and 
powers of specific courts. Despite this acknowledgment, point number 5 below suggests that 
most enacting legislation will be drafted in a way that is cognisant of the Kable incompatibility 
doctrine and its reach into the state sphere. 
120 George Winterton et al, Australian Federal Constitutional Law: Commentary and Materials 
(Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2007) 1162. 
121 Whilst this section has never been contemplated in respect of problem-solving courts, its broad 
wording could potentially cover the conferral of non-judicial power on judges and magistrates in 
the states and territories. 
122 Winterton et al, above n 120, 1159. 
123 (2004) 223 CLR 575, 600–1 [41]. 
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magistrate could no longer be said to be acting in an independent or impar-
tial manner. 
5 It is unlikely that state legislatures would enact legislation (whether inten-
tionally or by accident) that compromises the institutional integrity of their 
own courts.124 As Wheeler points out, ‘careful legislative drafting and de-
sign will do much to shield a state law from a successful Kable doctrine 
challenge’.125 This means that unless legislation creating a problem-solving 
court overtly directs or authorises the use of non-judicial power in a way 
that compromises the independence and/or impartiality of the court, it will 
be difficult to prove that the legislation is unconstitutional.126 In light of the 
High Court decision in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales 
(‘Kirk’),127 careful legislative drafting must avoid any ‘attempt to remove 
or limit the supervisory jurisdiction of the [state] supreme courts’ with re-
spect to jurisdictional error.128 
6 No challenge to the constitutionality of problem-solving courts has been 
made in any other country in the world. The idea of problem-solving courts 
grew out of the United States in the late 1980s129 and it is significant that 
no constitutional challenge to problem-solving courts has been made in 
America, given that it (too) has constitutionalised the separation of powers 
and its Bill of Rights (Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution) 
 
124 Ibid 601 [43]. 
125 Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power over State Courts’ (2005) 20(2) 
Australasian Parliamentary Review 15, 25. 
126 The two recent cases that invoked the Kable doctrine, International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New 
South Wales Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319 and Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, are exam-
ples where the legislature directed/authorised the use of non-judicial power in a way that com-
promised the institutional integrity of the court and/or was repugnant to the judicial process. 
127 (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
128 Wendy Lacey, ‘Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales: Breathing Life into Kable’ (2010) 34 
Melbourne University Law Review 641, 649. According to the majority in Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 
531, 581 [99]–[100] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (citations 
omitted): 
the supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the State Supreme Courts by the grant of prerogative 
relief or orders in the nature of that relief is governed in fundamental respects by principles 
established as part of the common law of Australia. That is, the supervisory jurisdiction exer-
cised by the State Supreme Courts is exercised according to principles that in the end are set by 
this Court. To deprive a State Supreme Court of its supervisory jurisdiction enforcing the limits 
on the exercise of State executive and judicial power by persons and bodies other than that 
Court would be to create islands of power immune from supervision and restraint. It would 
permit what Jaffe described as the development of ‘distorted positions’. And as already dem-
onstrated, it would remove from the relevant State Supreme Court one of its defining charac-
teristics. 
This is not to say that there can be no legislation affecting the availability of judicial review in 
the State Supreme Courts. It is not to say that no privative provision is valid. Rather, the obser-
vations made about the constitutional significance of the supervisory jurisdiction of the State 
Supreme Courts point to the continued need for, and utility of, the distinction between jurisdic-
tional and non-jurisdictional error in the Australian constitutional context. The distinction 
marks the relevant limit on State legislative power. Legislation which would take from a State 
Supreme Court power to grant relief on account of jurisdictional error is beyond State legisla-
tive power. Legislation which denies the availability of relief for non-jurisdictional error of law 
appearing on the face of the record is not beyond power. 
129 King et al, above n 3, 138. 
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guarantees the right to a fair and impartial tribunal. There are currently 
more than 2000 problem-solving courts in the United States and ‘[a]ll State 
Chief Justices and the American Bar Association have endorsed the expan-
sion of this form of justice.’130 
7 King et al argue that it is unlikely a constitutional challenge to problem-
solving courts will be made, as such a challenge is not in the interests of 
either prosecution or defence:  
The prosecution, being part of the executive, is unlikely to challenge a pro-
gram the executive has had a part in establishing and maintaining. Further, the 
defendant is unlikely to challenge a program that, in many cases, is voluntary 
and/or involves the possibility of avoiding a prison term.131 
8 Problem-solving courts are often concerned with offenders post-conviction 
and prior to sentence.132 Given that many problem-solving courts require a 
defendant to consent to departures from normal procedural fairness proc-
esses,133 it is difficult to see how slight incursions into independence and 
impartiality (in this context) would damage the institutional integrity of the 
court to the extent that it was operating unconstitutionally. 
It would not be misleading to suggest that since the decision in Kable, the 
High Court has applied the Kable incompatibility doctrine in a ‘guarded and 
restrained way.’134 The fact that Kirby J retired from the High Court in February 
2009 could indicate that the doctrine will continue to apply infrequently (at least 
for the short term).135 This is not to suggest that problem-solving courts have 
 
130 Ibid 142. The absence of a constitutional challenge to problem-solving courts in the United 
States may have much to do with its ‘dynamic approach to the relationship between judicial and 
non-judicial realms’: Guy, above n 75, 102. Guy states (emphasis in original) that the United 
States Supreme Court has emphasised that its ‘principal objective is to protect against an undue 
or excessive concentration of power, rather than embracing an essentially rigid or strict separa-
tion between the three branches [of government]’, citing United States v Nixon, 418 US 683 
(1974) in support. That said, an argument has still been made in the American problem-solving 
court literature that the functioning of drug courts is in breach of the separation of powers doc-
trine: see Hoffman, above n 110, 1523–8. There is no doubt that the Australian High Court has 
taken an interest in the United States approach to separation of powers — the idea that ‘it is 
legitimate for there to be some interference by one governmental branch into other branches to 
produce efficacious and more progressive governance’: Guy, above n 75, 106 (emphasis in 
original). It could be argued that the decisions of the High Court in cases such as Grollo v Palmer 
(1995) 184 CLR 348 and Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57 represent a more flexible and per-
haps pragmatic approach to the relationship between judicial and non-judicial power in Australia. 
In such an environment, state legislation conferring modest non-judicial power on a problem-
solving court may be seen as both ‘constitutionally permissible and politically desirable … [a 
move] required to respond to the increasing complexity of contemporary society’: Guy, above 
n 75, 113 (making the point more broadly, without direct reference to problem-solving courts). 
131 King et al, above n 3, 226. 
132 Ibid 224. 
133 See, eg, Drug Court Act 2000 (Qld) s 11. 
134 See Wheeler, above n 125, 22. 
135 Kirby J favoured a more expansive implementation of the Kable incompatibility doctrine as 
evidenced by his Honour’s dissenting judgments in Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, Baker (2004) 
223 CLR 513 and Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45. The Kable doctrine has only been applied twice by 
the High Court since 1996: see International Finance Trust Co Ltd v New South Wales Crime 
Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319; Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1. These cases have prompted aca-
demic commentary which suggests a possible resurgence of the Kable principle: see, eg, 
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‘free rein’ in the exercise of their powers. Indeed, Spigelman CJ in the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal decision of John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v 
Attorney-General (NSW) stated that ‘[t]he reasoning of the majority in Kable was 
not confined to the character of a function or power conferred by a state law. 
Some of the reasoning encompasses the manner in which a function or power is 
to be performed.’136 Whilst the High Court in cases like Gypsy Jokers Motorcy-
cle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police has been quick to acknowledge ‘the 
impossibility of making an exhaustive statement of the minimum characteristics 
of such an independent and impartial tribunal’,137 it did observe that ‘the 
conditions which must exist for courts in this country to administer justice 
according to law are inconsistent with some forms of external control of those 
courts appropriate to the exercise of authority by public officials and administra-
tors.’138 
This means that an appellate court reviewing the constitutionality of a prob-
lem-solving court can consider the extent to which state legislation vests non-
judicial power in that problem-solving court. In addition, an appellate court can 
consider the manner and magnitude in which that non-judicial power is actually 
being exercised. If the therapeutic and non-judicial activities of the problem-
solving court judge impact (or appear to impact) upon their independence and 
impartiality, then the functioning of the problem-solving court is susceptible to 
the Kable incompatibility test.139 If the problem-solving court judge fuses the 
role of the judiciary and executive to such an extent that the institutional integrity 
of the court is distorted, then again the functioning of the problem-solving court 
becomes susceptible to the Kable incompatibility test.140 In reality, any constitu-
 
Ayowande A McCunn, ‘The Resurgence of the Kable Principle: International Finance Trust 
Company’ (2010) 17 James Cook University Law Review 110; Elizabeth Southwood, ‘Comment: 
Extending the Kable Doctrine: South Australia v Totani’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 89. 
136 (2000) 181 ALR 694, 698 (emphasis in original). 
137 (2008) 234 CLR 532, 553 [10] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ), citing Bradley (2004) 
218 CLR 146, 163 [30] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
138 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532, 553 [10] 
(Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ). 
139 In Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363 [81], Gaudron J stated: 
Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are necessary for the maintenance of public 
confidence in the judicial system. Because State courts are part of the Australian judicial sys-
tem created by Ch III of the Constitution and may be invested with the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth, the Constitution also requires, in accordance with Kable … that, for the main-
tenance of public confidence, they be constituted by persons who are impartial and who appear 
to be impartial even when exercising non-federal jurisdiction. 
140 The extent to which a problem-solving court judge can exercise non-judicial functions usually 
associated with the executive does not give rise to a precise answer. In his address at the 17th 
Annual Conference of the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, Sir Anthony Mason 
stated that 
to treat court adjudication as if it is something less than the main game, in the context of Ch III 
courts under the Constitution, is to turn constitutional tradition on its head. 
Courts are courts; they are not general service providers who cater for ‘clients’ or ‘customers’ 
rather than litigants. And if courts describe themselves otherwise than as courts, they run the 
risk that their ‘clients and their ‘customers’ will regard them, correctly in my view, as some-
thing inferior to a court. 
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tional challenge based on Kable principles is likely to focus on the legislation 
that establishes the problem-solving court (and confers on it jurisdiction and 
functions) rather than on the individual exercise of jurisdiction and functions. 
Whilst legislation creating problem-solving courts often confers broad powers on 
a problem-solving court judge, there is no problem-solving court legislation in 
Australia that curtails the discretionary decision-making power of a judge. Given 
this constitutionally benign legislative backdrop, the words of Callinan and 
Heydon JJ in Fardon are apposite:  
So long as the State court, in applying legislation, is not called upon to act and 
decide, effectively as the alter ego of the legislature or the executive, so long as 
it is to undertake a genuine adjudicative process and so long as its integrity and 
independence as a court are not compromised, then the legislation in question 
will not infringe Ch III of the Constitution.141 
Despite the constitutional focus on legislation which may erode the institu-
tional integrity of state courts, much still falls on the shoulders of an individual 
problem-solving court judge to ensure that the processes they administer and the 
behaviour they present are consistent with the aspirational (if imprecise) ideals of 
independence and impartiality. In a problem-solving court where a therapeutic 
relationship between judge and participant develops, ‘bond[s] [result] from [the] 
interplay among the participant’s own pleasure with [their] success, [their] 
resulting gratitude toward the judge, and the judge’s pride in the participant’s 
progress.’142 The irony is that these personal relationships between judge and 
participant make problem-solving courts so effective, whilst at the same time 
placing pressure on the impartiality of the judge. Little argues that the  
trick for therapeutic jurisprudence is to make possible this success, while at the 
same time discouraging a judge from demonstrating partiality toward the par-
ticipant that can threaten the judge’s independence, credibility, and fairness to-
ward others affected by [their] adjudicatory role.143 
To this end, the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence can be evoked to con-
sider the role emotional intelligence might play in the performance of a problem-
solving court judge. 
 
  Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Future of Adversarial Justice’ in Michael O’Connell (ed), Conference 
Proceedings: 17th Annual Conference of the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration — A 
Collection of Papers (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2000) 23, 29. 
141 (2004) 223 CLR 575, 656 [219]. 
142 Little, above n 34, 212. 
143 Ibid. 
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V  EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE144 
Given the intersubjective dynamics145 of a problem-solving court, where the 
judge and participant are in a relationship of mutual influence, it follows that a 
judge must intelligently attend to his or her own emotions in order to maximise 
the chance of participant rehabilitation and positive behavioural change. Weis-
inger defines emotional intelligence as ‘the intelligent use of emotions’146 — an 
individual develops awareness of their emotions and uses them to beneficially 
aid their thinking and behaviour. Mayer, Caruso and Salovey suggest that 
[e]motional intelligence refers to an ability to recognize the meanings of emo-
tions and their relationships, and to reason and problem-solve on the basis of 
them. Emotional intelligence is involved in the capacity to perceive emotions, 
assimilate emotion-related feelings, understand the information of those emo-
tions, and manage them.147 
A  Emotional Self-Awareness 
The qualities of emotional self-awareness and emotional self-regulation are 
key indicators of intrapersonal intelligence, one of the ten multiple intelligences 
identified by psychologist Howard Gardner.148 Emotional self-awareness as an 
intrapersonal skill involves becoming consciously aware of emotions and 
understanding the factors that drive one’s emotional response.149 An individual 
no longer passively experiences emotions; they attempt to identify emotions 
consciously, as opposed to experiencing them subconsciously.150 It has been 
suggested in this article that empathy (a desirable judicial quality) can easily 
translate into sympathy (perhaps a desirable human quality, but an undesirable 
judicial quality) when the personal emotions of the problem-solving court judge 
are stimulated by the circumstances of a case. Self-awareness on the part of the 
problem-solving court judge can make these affective experiences conscious and 
self-regulation can stop these emotional triggers from being acted upon in a way 
that is detrimental to the fair hearing of a participant. Emotional self-awareness 
involves a problem-solving court judge being aware of both their mood and their 
 
144 This Part draws upon previous work of the author in a different context. See James Duffy, 
‘Empathy, Neutrality and Emotional Intelligence: A Balancing Act for the Emotional Einstein’ 
(2010) 10 Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 44. 
145 See Joseph Natterson, Beyond Countertransference: The Therapist’s Subjectivity in the 
Therapeutic Process (Jason Aronson, 1991) 29 (emphasis altered), where the author notes that  
in all human dyadic impingements, each person influences the other, no matter how obscure 
this process may be. Both parties are coequal contributors. Their respective fantasies and de-
sires, values and goals, are engaged in continuous struggle, through which both persons are 
continually changing. This intersubjective experience should be regarded as the basic precon-
dition for any theoretical understanding of psychotherapeutic process. 
146 Hendrie Weisinger, Emotional Intelligence at Work: The Untapped Edge for Success (Jossey-
Bass, 1998) xvi. 
147 John D Mayer, David R Caruso and Peter Salovey, ‘Emotional Intelligence Meets Traditional 
Standards for an Intelligence’ (1999) 27 Intelligence 267, 267 (citations omitted). 
148 See Howard Gardner, Intelligence Reframed: Multiple Intelligences for the 21st Century (Basic 
Books, 1999) 43. 
149 Daniel Goleman, Working with Emotional Intelligence (Bantam Books, 1998) 55.  
150 Ibid 55–6. 
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feelings about that mood.151 If a judge is unable to process their emotions with 
respect to the topic of the hearing and a participant’s background, involvement in 
crime and progress towards rehabilitation, then the emotional persuasion of the 
judge may inadvertently manifest itself in biased words, interventions and 
behaviours. If a problem-solving court judge remains unaware of their own 
feelings, and does not appreciate the intrapersonal and interpersonal drivers 
behind their emotional cognition, they are not in a position to assess the imparti-
ality of their processes. If emotional intelligence is conceived of as a staged 
process, Goleman correctly premises the importance of (judicial) self-awareness 
as a first step when — in the words of Krone and Dougherty — he contends that 
the ‘personal emotional competency of self-awareness contributes to self-
regulation that, in turn, undergirds the development of social skills’152 (such as 
conflict management). 
Self-awareness as an intrapersonal intelligence becomes more involved with 
an increased understanding of meta-emotions (the way we feel about having 
certain emotions — emotions about emotions).153 If a judge cannot identify how 
they feel about their current emotional state, there will be no inquiry as to 
whether those feelings or emotions are appropriate for the particular context. 
Take the previous example of a domestic violence court participant who suffers 
from depression.154 This participant reminded the problem-solving court judge of 
a personal family member’s battle with mental health issues. If the judge is 
feeling sadness and sympathy for the participant, an inquiry into their meta-
emotions should signal that these feelings may be inappropriate in the context of 
the hearing and may lead to party perceptions of favouritism and bias. Ideally a 
judge would be aware of the feelings aroused in them by a participant (emotion), 
assess whether those emotions are appropriate for the situation they are in (meta-
emotion) and choose to act, or refrain from acting, on those emotions (self-
regulation). If a problem-solving court judge is unaware of their meta-emotions, 
they will see no need for cognitive or behavioural self-regulation, and this can 
seriously jeopardise perceptions of impartiality. 
Rapport is strengthened if a problem-solving court judge is able to use an 
empathic approach to accurately perceive the meta-emotions of a participant and 
commence dialogue around these meta-emotions. Importantly, Jones and 
Bodtker note that differences in meta-emotions can form the basis of misunder-
standing and conflict.155 They highlight this problem with an example: ‘I would 
be ashamed about being angry, so I assume that you also would/should be 
ashamed about being angry’.156 This form of ‘egocentric attribution bias’ may 
mean that when a problem-solving court judge discovers that the participant does 
 
151 Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (Bantam Books, 1995) 47. 
152 Kathy Krone and Debbie Dougherty, ‘Book Review: Working with Emotional Intelligence by 
Daniel Goleman’ (1999) 13 Management Communication Quarterly 337, 338, citing Goleman, 
above n 149. 
153 Jones and Bodtker, above n 68, 239. 
154 See above Part III(A). 
155 Jones and Bodtker, above n 68, 240. 
156 Ibid. 
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not share his or her meta-emotions, the judge is ‘likely to make negative judg-
ments and attributions about the other which lead to or exacerbate conflict.’157 It 
will be detrimental for a problem-solving court judge to assume that their own 
meta-emotions are shared by the participant with whom they are attempting to 
establish a rapport. Misinterpretation of meta-emotion can lead to frustration on 
behalf of the participant and a loss of trust in the problem-solving court judge. 
Whilst a participant may feel that their side of the dispute has been heard, a 
judge’s misinterpretation of a participant’s meta-emotions may leave a partici-
pant feeling that they have not been understood. This is consistent with psycho-
logical writing on empathy, which explains effective empathy in terms of 
cognitive and affective components.158 If a judge is able to accurately perceive 
(and communicate about) a participant’s meta-emotion(s), this can lead to 
powerful and authentic empathy — an ‘important step toward emotional 
perspective taking, which is strongly linked to the use of more socially compe-
tent, collaborative conflict management.’159 
Finally, judicial self-awareness has a role to play in circumventing the effect of 
countertransference and emotional contagion. The presence of countertransfer-
ence can see a judge’s emotional state altered by a participant who triggers the 
recall of previous experiences of the judge. Self-awareness of emotion will allow 
a problem-solving court judge to detect the effects of countertransference, whilst 
self-awareness of meta-emotion or meta-cognition will prompt a judge to 
consider the appropriateness of the countertransference-induced emotions. The 
conflation of a judge’s previous personal issues and experiences with the present 
circumstances of a problem-solving court participant can be managed. It would 
certainly be inappropriate to stigmatise the occurrence of countertransference, as 
it is a construct that occurs automatically (often subconsciously) and unavoid-
ably due to the judge–client dyad.160 Countertransference behaviours, however, 
are not an unavoidable by-product of countertransference feelings, and this is 
how the construct of countertransference can be managed. It is only through 
emotional self-awareness that countertransference feelings can be detected and 
countertransference behaviours can be avoided. 
Emotional self-awareness can ensure that the independence and impartiality of 
a problem-solving court judge is not adversely affected by emotional contagion. 
Given the speed with which emotional contagion can occur, a sudden change in 
mood or outlook can suggest to a judge that they are being influenced by a party. 
If a problem-solving court participant has a positive mindset, and is smiling and 
charismatic, then judges may find themselves feeling upbeat about the partici-
pant’s prospects. If a participant is lethargic, non-communicative and frowning, a 
judge may become frustrated, angry and unmotivated to help the participant. 
Self-awareness as an element of intrapersonal intelligence promotes emotional 
introspection. As the afferent feedback generated by a judge in response to 
 
157 Ibid. 
158 Gladstein, above n 31, 468. 
159 Jones and Bodtker, above n 68, 241 (citations omitted). 
160 See Burwell-Pender and Halinski, above n 56, 43. 
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‘elementary motor mimicry’161 can be so quick, a problem-solving court judge 
may be able to name their felt emotions, but have no idea why they are being 
experienced. In this fashion, underdeveloped or non-existent meta-emotions can 
signal a warning to a judge that their emotional reactions are not proactive — 
they are a reactive response that has been ‘caught’ from another party. Ulti-
mately, because of the speed at which emotional contagion occurs,162 self-
awareness will need to be coupled with ongoing self-assessment throughout a 
problem-solving court hearing. It is simply not possible for a judge to diagnose 
and manage emotional contagion as it occurs. Emotional contagion is present to 
differing degrees in a myriad of contexts (including problem-solving courts) and 
more often than not, its effect is benign. As a psychological phenomenon, it does 
have the potential to influence the impartiality of a judge and to that extent, the 
necessity of self awareness as a precursor to emotional self-regulation is evident. 
B  Emotional Self-Regulation 
If emotional self-awareness involves a conscious step towards understanding 
what emotions are being experienced, then emotional self-regulation represents 
the skill of regulating behaviour based upon those emotions.163 This form of 
intrapersonal intelligence can prevent certain feelings from being acted upon in a 
way that undermines the fairness of a problem-solving court hearing. Emotional 
self-regulation can help to maintain the appearance of impartiality whilst a judge 
develops rapport and strives to be emotionally honest and present with a partici-
pant.164 At an intrapersonal level, what this really boils down to for a judge is the 
ability to identify the emotions they are experiencing and decide consciously to 
act or not act upon them. Schreier argues that ‘[t]he most salient aspect of 
emotional regulation competence is that one exercises conscious choice, to the 
extent possible, as to how, whether, and when to express (in contrast to feel) an 
emotion.’165 The importance of emotional self-awareness is again emphasised 
because a judge cannot consciously act, or refrain from acting, upon emotions to 
which they are oblivious. 
 
161 R William Doherty, ‘Emotional Contagion and Social Judgment’ (1998) 22 Motivation and 
Emotion 187, 187. 
162 Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson ‘have argued that the process of emotional contagion is much too 
automatic, fast and fleeting, and too ubiquitous to be accounted for by [overly] cognitive, asso-
ciative, or self-perception processes’: Doherty, ‘The Emotional Contagion Scale’, above n 70, 
131, citing Elaine Hatfield, John T Cacioppo and Richard L Rapson, ‘Primitive Emotional Con-
tagion’ in Margaret S Clark (ed), Emotion and Social Behavior (Sage, 1992) 151 and Hatfield, 
Cacioppo and Rapson, above n 64. It is therefore cautiously suggested that a problem-solving 
court judge may become aware of the affects of emotional contagion, by coupling strong emo-
tional self-awareness with continuous emotional self-assessment. Whilst emotional contagion can 
occur extremely quickly, automatically and often unconsciously, the fact that it physically mani-
fests itself through the mimicking and synchronisation of expressions, vocalisations, postures and 
movements suggests that it can be independently diagnosed. 
163 See Lori S Schreier, ‘Emotional Intelligence and Mediation Training’ (2002) 20 Conflict 
Resolution Quarterly 99, 103. 
164 Ibid 101. 
165 Ibid 103. 
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A judge’s ability to emotionally self-regulate is a learnable competency; the 
‘[s]kill [of] understanding that inner emotional state[s] need not correspond to 
outer expression, both in oneself and in others’.166 Writers such as Lynn rein-
force staged models of emotional intelligence where skills such as self-
awareness and self-control, empathy, social expertness (building relationships 
and using emotions positively in relationships), personal influence and mastery 
of purpose and vision are all identified.167 Importantly, Lynn views these 
competencies as interrelated and necessary precursors to each other.168 This 
means that a problem-solving court judge will not be able to properly empathise 
or establish meaningful relationships and rapport with a participant, and their 
degree of personal influence with a participant will be diminished, if (as a 
starting point) they are not emotionally aware and are unable to emotionally self-
regulate. Emotional self-awareness and emotional self-regulation are the 
cornerstones of emotional intelligence theory, and therapeutic judging techniques 
incorporating catharsis, empathy or the Pygmalion effect will be unsuccessful in 
their absence. 
VI  CO N C L U S I O N 
Problem-solving court judges employing the principles of therapeutic jurispru-
dence are engaging in a ‘court-craft’169 that is vastly different to that of a judge 
in the traditional court hierarchy. Applying tough legal sanctions to criminal 
offending may appease the punitive wishes of the wider public, but by dealing 
with the story behind a participant’s offending, problem-solving court judges can 
begin to facilitate social solutions to social problems.170 Judges working in this 
non-traditional role must possess both strong interpersonal and intrapersonal 
skills. These skills are essential if the judge is to make active use of his or her 
judicial authority to facilitate positive behavioural change with a participant. 
Collaboration with the executive and cooperation with the different actors in a 
problem-solving court places the spotlight on the independent and impartial 
administration of these courts. This article has highlighted that problem-solving 
courts are susceptible to constitutional challenge if their lack of independence 
and impartiality is sufficient to compromise their institutional integrity. Problem-
solving court judges must ensure that their active and very personal involvement 
with participants does not compromise their individual behaviour and the 
processes they must administer. In the words of former High Court Chief Justice 
Sir Harry Gibbs, ‘the independence and authority of the judiciary, upon which 
 
166 Carolyn Saarni, ‘Emotional Competence: A Developmental Perspective’ in Reuven Bar-On and 
James D A Parker (eds), The Handbook of Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Development, As-
sessment, and Application at Home, School, and in the Workplace (Jossey-Bass, 2000) 68, 77. 
167 Adele B Lynn, The EQ Difference: A Powerful Plan for Putting Emotional Intelligence to Work 
(AMACOM, 2005), 39–40, cited in King et al, above n 3, 243–4. 
168 Lynn, above n 167, 40. 
169 Jelena Popovic, ‘Judicial Officers: Complementing Conventional Law and Changing the Culture 
of the Judiciary’ (2002) 20(2) Law in Context 121, 128. 
170 Freiberg, above n 2, 9. 
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the maintenance of a just and free society so largely depends, in the end has no 
more secure protection than the strength of the judges themselves’.171 
 
171 Sir Harry Gibbs, ‘Foreword’ in Justice B H McPherson, The Supreme Court of Queensland 
1859–1960: History Jurisdiction Procedure (Butterworths, 1989) iii. 
